rd the feminine and toward women, the mysterious opposite sex, ures and fogs Jung's sight. As Jane and Joseph Wheelwright have d, Jung may have been introvertedly exploring the psychology of wn anima rather than the psychology of women (see also D. Wehr,). In his essay, "Woman in Europe," Jung himself wrote:

hat can a man say about woman, his own opposite? I mean of course mething sensible, that is outside the sexual programme, free of resent- ent, illusion and theory. Where is the man to be found capable of such periority? Woman always stands just where the man's shadow falls, so at he is only too liable to confuse the two. (1927/1970b, p. 113)

e elementary fact that a person always thinks another's psychology is entical with his own effectively prevents a correct understanding of femi- ne psychology. This is abetted by woman's own unconsciousness and ssivity, useful though these may be from a biological point of view: e allows herself to be convinced by the man's projected feelings [and us also accepts his definition of her]. (ibid. pp. 116-117)

ng's tendency to organize his thinking in nineteenth-century Kan- polarizations (Willeford, 1975) is especially pronounced in his treat- of the sexes. If man be conscious, woman, his opposite, must fore be unconscious; if man is active, woman must be passive. Psy- gy *per se*—man's psychology—is the psychology of the mind; wom- sychology, therefore, becomes primarily biologically determined ubject to the heart.

this context as well as in the broader context of his era, Jung's deline- of the neglected feminine as standing for the unconscious, the tive, the passive, and the affective feelings makes sense. These were which, until the advent of Freud and Jung, were seen as belong- o the private sphere and to Romantic literature rather than to the world of the Market and its positivistic science (Ellenberger, 1970). e early twentieth century values were starting to change. There was ain unease with the one-sided masculine mode. Freud and Jung, e one hand, brought up the unconscious as a counterpoint to the ious world; on the other hand, women themselves were no longer nt (if they ever were) embodying the one-sidedly "feminine" at- es required of them. Women started to be visible, active, conscious, rofessional members of society who had to be taken into account. rd source of change was the increasing evidence of the pathologi- nsequences of the era's sharp male-female split and of society's res- ons on the behavior expected of each sex. The patriarchy of Jung's

time, which we inherit, projected all outward power onto men while it imposed a narrow, idealized role on women. At the same time, it looked down on woman as weak, evil, and earthy. Given this split, it was women who most often sought the psychological help of Freud and Jung, as of Charcot and Janet before them, and as women do of therapists today.

TYPOLOGY

Perhaps Jung's best known contribution to personality theory is his theory of the various psychological types, which is presented in the first book Jung wrote after his traumatic break with Freud, *Psychological Types* (Jung, 1921/1971).*

The types, as Jung formulated them, fall into two categories (which Jung called attitudes), introversion and extraversion, each having four functions: thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition. The introvert takes objects inside, the reference point being the reality within him or her; the extravert reaches out to connect with or define reality through contact with, or direct inspiration from, exterior objects. Each of the four functions can be experienced in an extraverted or an introverted way.

> For complete orientation all four functions should contribute equally: thinking should facilitate cognition and judgment, feeling should tell us how and to what extent a thing is important or unimportant for us, sensation should convey concrete reality to us through seeing, hearing, tasting, sensing etc., and intuition should enable us to divine the hidden possibilities in the background, since these too belong to the complete picture of a given situation. (Jung 1921/1971, p. 518)

Jung's major interest, as can be seen from the book's initial subtitle, *The Psychology of Individuation*, was the process of psychological development. *Psychological Types* was and remains invaluable as a gateway toward the nonjudgmental appreciation of all the varying ways people react to, function, and develop in the world. Jung initially describes the types as gender neutral:

> As a general psychological phenomenon . . . sex makes no difference either; one finds the same contrast among women of all classes. . . .

* the germ for the book was already apparent in a short lecture Jung gave in 1913, where he introduced the terms extraversion and introversion and applied them to types of mental illness, to philosophy and, in the final two paragraphs, to the psychological theories of Freud and Adler. (Jung 1921/1971, appendix)

> The types seem to be distributed quite at random [with respect to race, sex, class and education]. (ibid. p. 331)

In spite of this initial avowal of randomized occurrence of types, within the elaboration of the theory Jung often allocates the types along gender lines. For instance, after declaring that the types are randomly distributed, Jung narrows this view and, in the second half of the book, states that extraverted feeling occurs predominantly in women (p. 356), while extraverted thinking is predominantly male (p. 351). He defines the majority of introverted feeling types again as women (p. 388), while the majority of extraverted sensation types are men (p. 363). Extraverted intuitives, he says, are more commonly female (p. 369) while he finds introverted thinking types are more often male (p. 351). Only introverted sensation and introverted intuition are assigned no gender dominance.

What may have been true in Jung's time, no doubt influenced by socialization and custom, persists to a lesser extent today. Kiersey and Bates note that six out of ten women still show a preference for feeling as a primary function, while six out of ten men have thinking as their primary function (Kiersey and Bates, 1978, p. 200). Myers (1962) finds that only the thinking-feeling dimension tests along gender lines. Kiersey and Bates declare that any gender difference is relatively minor (*op. cit.*, p. 20). Whether this—as almost all gender differences—is a difference due to socialization and culture, or is even in part biologically determined, is open to question (Douglas, 1985), as is the effect on personality type of our extraverted thinking mode of education.

What is problematical in Jung's statements is that the more common subtly becomes the more psychologically appropriate and healthy and, finally, a universal truth. Jung tends to equate feeling with the feminine and with women and thinking with the masculine and men, no matter what an individual's particular type may be. "Feeling is a specifically feminine virtue" (Jung, 1927/1970a, p. 41). Consequently Jung gives woman the capacity, but also the restrictive burden, of functioning primarily in and through relationship and feeling. Thinking becomes reserved for men and is described as inferior and unconscious in women, deriving from their animus. Thinking gets equated with spirituality, while feeling—a question of values—is mixed up with emotionality in such a way that Jung seems to be assigning gender specificity to each. "It is an almost regular occurrence for a woman to be wholly contained, spiritually, in her husband, and for a husband to be wholly contained, emotionally, in his wife" (Jung, 1925/1954, p. 195; see also: Jung, 1935/1966, p. 188 and Jung, 1929/1967, pp. 40-41).

The fact that women of Jung's time and today tend toward being feeling types—and men, thinking types—does not require the subsequent stereotyping and limitation in Jung's development of the theme. As a thinking type myself, I have the odd and disconcerting experience, in reading Jung, of seeing my way of functioning in the world allocated to men. I am included in descriptions of a mode that seemingly belongs only to a man, while descriptions of the feminine exclude me and my feminine—albeit logical and thinking—self. Relating to the world primarily through a developed thinking function is a mode that Jung, in theory, found "open to women of all classes," but in working out his theory, he turned it into essentially forbidden territory. The thinking mode is declared inferior in women: an unhealthy and unallowed aberration. I find this both troubling and alienating. It confines men and women to a painfully restricted sense of appropriateness that echoes the prejudices of the nineteenth century rather than the reality of an individual's being and of her or his individual path. A woman who conceptualizes her own thinking as masculine (D. Wehr, 1987), or a man who evaluates his feeling as feminine, estranges and distances the function. It transfers a normal part of the self onto a taboo "other," thus adding to the pain and confusion already inflicted by conventional cultural stereotyping. Transferring it in this way also doesn't work, for the thinking and feeling of one sex don't quite fit descriptions that were tailored for the other. Nothing in Jung's initial theory demands this compartmentalization and exclusion. In fact Jung himself noted a different socio-cultural reason for the disparity, one which has nothing to do with types or gender but echoes J. S. Mill's vapor bath and snow analogy:

> When a woman is brought up to think only certain things, she cannot think at all. You cannot bring anyone up to function only in certain ways. If you hinder anyone's feeling or thinking, he will not function properly any more. (Jung, 1938/1984, p. 89)

In spite of statements such as these (and Jung's unprejudiced approach to individual patients), the working out of Jung's typological theory in practice acts, even today, to alienate those who were born with the "wrong" typology for their gender. It makes analytical psychology seem, on the surface, unsuitable to many who otherwise would be attracted to it, especially those who desire a psychology that honors and is responsive to all the complicated mixtures that constitute human individuali-

ty. Jung respects individual differences, but then seems to abdicate this respect in favor of formulations and comments which derive from the sexist prejudice of his time. This area of his theory is undergoing major revision today, though regrettably far too many Jungians pay lip service to the revisions while maintaining the more restrictive and time-bound form. This echoes something Jung noticed in his fellow psychiatrists' response to Freud's masterly reformulation of psychology:

> A few writers spoke of it appreciatively and then, on the next page, proceeded to explain their . . . cases in the same old way. They behaved very like a man who, having eulogized the idea or fact that the earth was a sphere, calmly continues to represent it as flat. (Jung, 1943/1966, p. 10).

EROS AND LOGOS

The split along gender lines which contaminates his typology extends to Jung's concept of Logos and Eros.

> It is probably Logos and Eros, impersonal and personal, which are the most fundamental differences between man and woman. (Adler, [Ed.], 1973, Vol. 1, p. 48)

> Woman's psychology is founded on the principle of Eros the great binder and loosener, whereas from ancient times the ruling principle ascribed to man is Logos. (Jung, 1927/1970b, p. 123)

> For purely psychological reasons I have . . . tried to equate the masculine consciousness with the concept of Logos and the feminine with that of Eros. By Logos I meant discrimination, judgment, insight, and by Eros I meant the capacity to relate. (Jung, 1955-1956/1970, p. 179)

Interestingly, Jung often seems to value the Romantic Eros more than the Market's Logos. He finds that Logos rests on the supremacy of the word and calls it "the congenital vice of this age" (Jung, 1957/1970, p. 286), accompanied as it is by the repression of feeling. Eros, on the other hand, is encouraged for it leads to relatedness, nourishment, and love. Jung defines Logos in terms that are similar to the Eastern concept of Yang: denoting masculinity, consciousness, spirit, thought, analysis, action, rationality, and light. Eros is given the opposite Yin attributes: femininity, unconsciousness, earthiness, relatedness, feelings, passivity, nourishment, darkness, and the material.

Jung however, along with many of his followers, confuses the concepts

of Eros and Logos, and of Yin and Yang, by making the attributions exclusively along gender lines. When gender is tied to the concepts, they are impoverished (as are the function types when restricted along gender lines), leading instead to restriction, confusion, and stereotyping (Samuels, 1985). Yin, the feminine, is confused with the female gender; Yang, the masculine, with the male. In Chinese philosophy Yin and Yang are conceived of as present in everything, though one quality may vastly predominate. Jung does posit an essential and all-important contrasexuality underneath this rigorously gender-specific personality, but he also tends to parcel out Eros and Logos according to gender while linking each with the "correct" function: Eros with feeling as woman's terrain; Logos with thinking as man's domain. Yet at the same time that he limits, Jung also allows for the very opposite. He asserts the vital importance of integrating both feminine and masculine sides of the self whatever these may be. Within the psyche, Jung declares, the inner woman or man is the opposite of the other. "The supreme recognition is that a man is also a woman and a woman is also a man" (Jung, 1933/1976, p. 370).

ANIMUS AND ANIMA

Jung's concept of fundamental androgyny could potentially free analytical psychology from the stereotypical prejudices of his age. It allows individuals to experience and develop all parts of themselves, whether or not these parts are conventionally gender-specific for their time and culture. But let us return for a moment and follow the development of theory in Jung's idea of the animus and anima. Jung's formulation perceives an interior complementarity and compensation that rounds out the individual by giving him or her an inner contrasexual "other." Jung's argument for this androgyny is first of all based on the biological premise that genes in both sexes are male and female. From here he branches into the theory of archetypes, calling the contrasexual archetype in man the anima, the inner feminine, and in woman the animus, the inner masculine.

According to Jung, an archetype is a predisposition toward some image or form. It is an eternal, unchanging, primordial, and collective deposit of "certain ever recurring psychic experiences" (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 444) common throughout the history of the world. The archetype itself does not change and, because it remains in the unconscious, can never be fully expressed. However, the outward mode of presentation

and the value accorded it are subject to the vagaries of a particular time and culture, to individual experience, and to all the varying interpretations of the conscious mind. Thus, though the archetype itself is unchanging and eternal, its manifestations can reflect the prejudices of the time (Douglas, 1985). Archetypes are not excuses for the status quo, though it is inevitable that people clothe the archetypes in accordance with the fashions of their time and then tend to define them according to the way they have made them appear.

Jung gives a definition of the archetypes of the animus and anima in "Marriage as a Psychological Relationship" (1925/1954). I have chosen this particular passage because it contains a clear and concise definition of the construct, yet at the same time may show elements of why this particular part of Jung's theory is perhaps the most disputed concept in analytical psychology today.

> Every man carries within him the eternal image of woman, not the image of this or that particular woman, but a definite feminine image. This image is fundamentally unconscious, an hereditary factor of primordial origin engraved in the living organic system of man, an imprint or "archetype" of all the ancestral experiences of the female, a deposit, as it were, of all the impressions ever made by woman—in short, an inherited system of psychic adaptation. Even if no woman existed, it would still be possible, at any given time, to deduce from this unconscious image exactly how woman would have to be constituted psychically. The same is true of the woman: she too has her inborn image of man. Actually, we know from experience that it would be more accurate to describe it as the image of *men*, whereas in the case of the man it is rather the image of *woman*. Since this image is unconscious, it is always unconsciously projected upon the person of the beloved, and is one of the chief reasons for passionate attraction or aversion. I have called this image the "anima," and I find the scholastic question *Habet mulier animam?* [does a woman have a soul?] especially interesting, since in my view it is an intelligent one inasmuch as the doubt seems justified. Woman has no anima, no soul, but she has an animus. The anima has an erotic, emotional character, the animus a rationalizing one. Hence most of what men say about feminine eroticism, and particularly about the emotional life of women, is derived from their own anima projections and distorted accordingly. On the other hand, the astonishing assumptions and fantasies that women make about men come from the activity of the animus, who produces an inexhaustible supply of illogical arguments and false explanations. (Jung, 1925/1954, p. 198)

Jung's medieval comment about the lack of soul in woman is, alas,

repeated throughout his work (see especially: Jung, 1935/1966, p. 189; 1929/1967, p. 41, and 1927-1970a, also p. 41). It is a statement, albeit perhaps a teasing one, that dates and weakens this part of his theory, one example of the type of rhetoric that alienates many who might otherwise be attracted to analytical psychology (see Goldenberg, 1976; Lauter and Rupprecht, 1985; D. Wehr, 1987).

The anima and its opposite, the animus, are another example of Jung's thinking in polarizations. Though Jung did not *in theory* see the animus and anima, no more than the sexes themselves, as inherently inferior or superior (Maduro and Wheelwright, 1977, p. 112), and though each pole is theoretically equal and no depreciation is intended, yet the comparison inevitably draws him into a socio-culturally induced hierarchy of superiority and inferiority (Derrida, 1976). Jung describes both animus and anima as extraordinarily many-sided, but the positive aspects of the anima get precedence, while the animus' negative attributes add to its inadvertent inferior status. Jung states that the paramount role of the animus and anima is as a personification of the unconscious and a bridge to it: a way toward realizing undeveloped parts of oneself. This invaluable role tends to get lost under Jung's restrictive value judgements. In his further expositions of the anima and animus, man's feminine side continues to appear in a much more favorable light than woman's masculine.

Jung discovered the anima within himself, but only later deduced the existence of the animus. He found support for this concept in the psyches of his women patients (Jung, 1963). Jung's main work on the animus and anima occurs in "The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious" (1928/1966), in the chapter entitled "Anima and Animus." His interest and attention, normal for a man, are devoted to the exploration of the anima (seventeen pages) while the animus receives a scant five pages at the end of the essay.

The anima sounds very like the Romantic descriptions of the feminine I outlined in the previous chapter. I will try to do justice to her (the anima) by using Jung's own words: she is "a personification of the unconscious in general, and . . . a bridge to the unconscious" (Jung, 1929/1967, p. 42). She is the soul, the "*archetype of life itself*" (Jung, 1911-1912/1967, p. 437; emphasis in the original); she contains "all those common human qualities which the conscious attitude lacks" (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 468). She is both young and old, mother and daughter, worldly, of doubtful chastity, and virginal, childlike and naive (Jung,

1925/1954, p. 199). The anima is the mother and "the glamorous, possessive, moody and sentimental seductress in a man" (Jung, 1951/1968, p. 266). She "intensifies, exaggerates, falsifies and mythologizes" (Jung, 1936/1968, p. 70). Jung adds that:

> The anima also stands for the "inferior" function and for that reason frequently has a shady character; in fact she sometimes stands for evil itself. She is as a rule the fourth person . . . She is the dark and dreaded maternal womb which is of an essentially ambivalent nature. (Jung, 1936/1968, pp. 150-151)

The anima is also the place where the symbol of wholeness and redemption appears (Jung, 1955-1956/1970, pp. 356-357) which wants to reconcile and unite (Jung, 1946/1975, p. 304).

In these and many more descriptions of the anima, the excess of affect that pervades nineteenth-century writing on the feminine is marked. "The anima is a factor of the utmost importance in the psychology of a man wherever emotions and affects are at work" (Jung, 1934/1968, p. 70). Because of this emotional weight and because Jung sought to understand woman through his own anima which, as anima, he says "intensifies, exaggerates, falsifies and mythologizes," his view of women often takes on an excessive emotional load—Jung, under the anima's influence, becomes either too personally disparaging or too excessively charmed. Instead of women and "the emotional life of women," he appears to be describing his own thinking typology's feeling type anima.

Jung's argument that the anima is single does not seem convincing. In these and other multifaceted descriptions of Jung's, the anima appears to be as multiple as the animus. However, the result of conceiving of the inner feminine as single is that it concentrates her power and makes her much more alluring than the diffused masculine of the animus. Casting the man's feminine as a single entity in his psyche gives her far more numinosity than a real woman, while the animus as depicted in his many sorry guises appears decidedly inferior to a real man. It would seem that both could manifest as either single or multiple depending on the individual. As a matter of fact, Jung, in answering a question about the possibility of a woman having a single animus figure, makes an exception:

> Many souls are young; they are promiscuous; they are prostitutes in the unconscious and sell themselves cheaply. They are like flowers that bloom and die and come again. Other souls are older, like trees or palms. They find, or must seek, one complete animus, who shall perhaps be many in one. And when they find him it is like the closing of an electric circuit. Then they know the meaning of life. (quoted in McGuire and Hull, 1977, p. 29)

Though it solves one problem, this little-known statement of Jung's raises another. By stating that old souls have single inner figures while also teaching that the animus is plural and the anima single, Jung seems to be inferring that women, by and large, are more undeveloped, "younger souls," than men. All in all, man and his anima become the more valued half of the opposites, while woman and her animus appear decidedly inferior. Though I found many passages to choose from in describing a positive anima, in Jung's work I could find only three descriptions of a positive animus (other than the animus' invaluable role as a bridge to the unconscious):

> (1) The positive animus tries to discern and discriminate. (Jung, 1946/1975, p. 304)

> (2) [He] gives a woman's consciousness a capacity for reflection, deliberation and self-knowledge. (Jung, 1951/1968, p. 16)

> (3) In his real form he is a hero, there is something divine about him. (Jung, 1934/1976, p. 238)

Jung often refers to the animus as the carrier of Logos for the woman and therefore to be entrusted with her thinking. Thus, again, thinking is equated with masculinity and feeling with femininity, and both are seen, *ipso facto*, as inferior when present in the "wrong" sex (e.g., Jung, 1927/1970b, p. 127). This leaves a woman of the thinking type in the odd position of already having a differentiated thinking function, yet being told to look to her animus to cultivate her most developed quality because thinking and discrimination are what she supposedly needs to cultivate most. In the same vein, a predominantly feeling type man is required to rely on his anima to further cultivate his already well-differentiated feeling. It makes more sense for there to be feeling animi and thinking animae to guide one toward the particular areas where one lacks conscious development, whatever these areas may be; both men and women who have thinking as their best-developed function can still fall into stubborn and opinionated disputatiousness, and women and men who are feeling types can also sometimes be moony and moody. The logic of the interaction between types and animus/anima is not fully

worked out in Jung's pioneering work on the subject.

Given the biases of Jung's time, much of this idea (that women as feeling types would have thinking animi and that men as thinking types would have feeling animae) makes sense, but without these biases the model he presents is no longer convincing in this specific area. There is also the problem of gender stereotyping itself, and the way this infiltrates Jung's theory of animus and anima. Stereotyping is contrary to Jung's emphasis on individuality, yet it appears in his treatment of the archetypes of animus and anima and of the psychology of men and women. In his writing on this subject Jung often generalizes in the same way that positivist science generalizes. By taking the person as representative of his or her gender, Jung's theory conforms the individual to the gender-expectations of his day rather than freeing the individual to expand into all aspects of his or her personality. This contradicts the tone of his other writings and what is known of his relationship to patients.

In contrast to the anima, Jung, as I have said, most often portrays the animus in negative terms. The tone he uses is reminiscent of the judging, "spoiler," negative animus himself. Jung is at his most opinionated when he describes the animus as opinionated, unoriginal, beside the mark, argumentative, protesting, and conventional. D. Wehr (1987) has noted the anger in these and other epithets Jung hurls at the animus, as if somehow Jung were caught by the very thing he is scientifically trying to describe. He calls the animus a collective conscience, a "court of condemnatory judges," an "assembly of fathers" (Jung, 1928/1966, p. 207): critical, irrelevant, and maddening. Jung adds that: "If the woman happens to be pretty, these animus opinions have for the man something rather touching and childlike about them . . . But if the woman does not stir his sentimental side . . . then her animus opinions irritate the man to death" (p. 208). In statements such as these, Jung seems to see woman's psychology only through its effect on the male. Woman herself vanishes behind her exterior. Her ability to please or not please a man, rather than her own psychological development, suddenly becomes the central issue.

A thinking woman is described as "one of those creatures" (p. 208), an "animus hound" (p. 209) who functions in an inferior fashion through her inferior masculine, the animus. Jung finds the internal, disapproving, patriarchal voice of the animus in woman to be a natural one. It seems to me to be a prevalent voice in women even today, appearing

at the beginning of therapy, for instance, and reappearing to harangue us when we are stressed, but it is not a natural one. Jung's initial description of the negative animus *names* a complex that bedevils many women. This naming is invaluable. However, Jung's negative view of the animus goes too far and implicates a woman's very sense of her own value. Rather than ascribing the negative animus to a woman's individual and inevitable failing, it seems more fruitful to understand it as the baggage we all bring with us in a patriarchy: a consequence of the status and role of women in society, and of who defines us and what voices (Jung's included) we have internalized. For instance, Horner has described this internal disapproving voice in contemporary terms as a double-bind that causes fear of success (1968). In her follow-up studies she has found the voice changing (1970); in more recent updates that examine later studies (1981 and 1989), Horner finds this voice persistent, though increasingly less powerful than in 1970. As we will see in later chapters, this same fate seems to have followed the animus over time.

One reason for the animus to be perceived and described by Jung in such a negative way may be that he is exploring his own subjective and introverted thinking masculine psychology—his discovery and analysis of his own anima's undeveloped side rather than an objective psychology of women. Jung's feeling type anima might be blind to the shadow side of his own thinking, therefore, and project the inferior part of his thinking onto women. Jung's undeveloped extraverted thinking* would carry this shadow. Another way of putting this is that the animus Jung gives to women more convincingly depicts the inferior thinking of Jung's own anima's negative animus. Jung catches a glimpse of this very problem when he writes of the individuation of a thinking type like himself:

> That last touch would be . . . realization through his inferior thinking. Invariably I see that the last realization, the primordial stuff from which the superior function is made, is the last thing to be touched by analysis. A thinker, for instance, has a thought morality . . . It gives one an idea of the enormous effort it was for man to detach himself from the inferior parts of his superior function in order to become human, to establish himself against nature . . . [Inferior thinking] is thinking, all right, but entirely impure; that is, thinking like nature would think, the worst kind of feminine thinking, like the thinking of an ignorant cook . . . the thinking of a female worm. Let a man like Kant see his inferior thinking and he would hang himself right away. For me to admit my inferior thinking

* see Beebe, 1987, for further development of these typological intricacies.

> is the worst thing under the sun. I would admit anything, moral insanity, incest, any vice, first. That inferior thinking is the worst. (Jung, 1938/1984, p. 273)

More often, Jung seems to project the inferior part of his superior function onto women and accuse them of its gross and primitive defects. However, there are also socio-cultural causes for Jung's negative and limited evaluation of the animus. One is the low esteem that men in his era (and still too often today) held of women and women's internalization of that low opinion, contributing to the low self-esteem characteristic of many women. Another cause is women's self-consciousness about their supposed deficits, coupled with a very real lack of educational opportunity: a place in which their thinking capacities could grow and develop naturally. Because women were so undervalued in Jung's time, he may have felt the psychological need to make the anima's value compensatorially high; but doing the opposite for women only exacerbates their lower status and places them in double jeopardy by undervaluing the animus to compensate for the overvaluation of masculine qualities and men in the outside world. There is also the likelihood that since women of Jung's day had little chance to express their "masculine" side, when it first appeared it may have been overdetermined and tended to manifest in a primitive and undifferentiated form (like the new possibilities in our dreams which often turn up first in their most negative and reprehensible shape).

Over time, as both men and women have increasingly been allowed the expression of all sides of themselves, and as more complete humans, both male and female, are in evidence, the animus and anima appear as more positive and helpful. In footnotes added to later editions of Jung's work, Jung himself began to refer to Emma Jung's (1957/1974) writing on the animus (which presents some of the animus's more positive aspects) as more complete than his own (e.g. Jung, 1911-1912/1967, p. 183n; 1934/1980, p. 768; 1940/1968, p. 124n.; 1940/1969, p. 30n.; 1943/1966, p. 90n; and 1948/1968, p. 247).

A final problem brings us to Jung's idea of projection. Man's propensity to project his anima onto a woman can lead to the confusion of the anima with a woman's own psychology. D. Wehr (1987) makes a strong argument that this confusion occurs throughout Jung's work. She says that it causes Jung to form "a blurred agenda" where the development of a man's contrasexual side is confused with woman's psychology *per se*. It also can act as "subliminal advertising" so that the projection of

Jung's (or a Jungian therapist's) anima covertly informs a woman how she should really be, and so distorts her own sense of herself and impedes her discovery of her inner reality. "Since we all tend to become who we are addressed as being, men's anima projections help shape women's sense of self" (D. Wehr, 1987, p. 104).

PROJECTION

Jung noted that most people do not wish to see their own contrasexual sides. Instead they tend to project these, and both positive and negative aspects of themselves, onto someone else. In the case of what is perceived as the contrasexual, the projection is usually onto someone of the opposite sex. Projection, in Jung's theory, is the placing of one's unconscious contents onto a more or less suitable exterior object. "Projections change the world into the replica of one's own unknown face" (Jung, 1951/1968, p. 9). Jung found that men tend to place all their fear of, doubt about, and fascination with their own unacceptable feminine qualities onto women. A woman then becomes both a "soul-image" for a man and a repository of evil. Thus men can be, at one and the same time, both lovers and misogynists. Women in turn tend to give over their power, intelligence, worldly force, and assertiveness to a man, helping his success rather than developing their own capacities. There are, as Jung states, "many women who, by completely disregarding their own lives, succeed in representing their husband's soul-image for a very long time" (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 472). Thus he describes marriages and love-relationships as often taking place between people of opposite types, each of whom has developed what is yet undeveloped in the other and so carries and personifies it for the other. Jung states that an essential task in psychological development is becoming conscious of one's own anima and animus and withdrawing projections. These tasks, though, Jung comments, are very lonely ones, as projection "gives the feeling of being connected" (Jung, 1934, p. 244). It is the way most people relate to others.

Part of the harm in projection, Jung finds, is that besides leaving a person incomplete, it is also a way to escape all that one cannot accept in one's own character, including one's own complicity in the evil of the world. The core of Jung's psychology may be his wrestling with the problem of evil and his perception of the consequences of the human tendency to project internal evil out onto others. Inherent in the problem of evil are Jung's concepts of the shadow (what is unconscious, or what